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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports the results of a series of laboratory experiments in which 
different groups of subjects were presented with a series of 2-person decision 
problems all of which generate the same equilibrium outcomes. Each problem 
was presented to different groups of subjects in at least two ways. In some 
cases, it was explicitly represented as a multistage game while in others it 
was represented as a one stage game in which both subjects choose their 
strategies simultaneously. Although the games varied in their complexity, in 
no case did a subject have more than three strategies from which to choose, 
and, in each case, one of the players could guarantee a secure outcome while 
the other player possessed a self-defeating (incredible) threat. 
In some cases, the form in which the decision problem is presented 
significantly affects the outcome. Surprisingly, these effects were most 
prominant in the simplest decision problems where the differences in 
presentation would seem to be most transparent. In these simple problems, it 
appears that subjects are much more likely to use (and fear) incredible 
threats when the problem is presented as a one-stage rather than a multistage 
game. 
1. Introduction 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) have identified a number of properties 
which they believe should be satisfied by any solution concept in games in 
which it is common knowledge that all players are perfectly rational. Among 
others, they argue that the choices of the players should be undominated, 
survive the iterated deletion of dominated strategies, and satisfy various 
solution concepts based on backwards induction. In addition, they also insist 
that rational decision making implies that the solution of any game should be 
0 0 h 0 f 0 1 1nvar1ant to t e extens1ve arm representat1on. In contrast, some 
experimental studies of individual decision making under uncertainty (see, for 
example Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) indicate that the behavior of real human 
beings may depend, sometimes dramatically, on how a problem is presented to 
the subjects. 
Our objective in this paper is twofold. First, we investigate the 
circumstances under which two of the principles of rationality mentioned 
above, backward induction and iterated dominance, are likely to govern the 
behavior of subjects in actual decision problems. Second, we investigate the 
extent to which the "frame" or form of presentation of the game affects the 
way subjects play it. These two objectives are related since the form in 
which a decision problem is presented to subjects may make one of the 
rationality principles stated above more salient. For example, while iterated 
dominance can be defined in the normal of a game, subgame perfection cannot. 
In contrast, iterated dominance may be less transparent for games presented in 
an extensive form with a sequence of moves. 
1 This is in contrast to refinements based on the extensive form of a game, 
such as perfection (Selten (1975)) and sequential rationality (Kreps and 
Wilson (1981)). 
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We performed a series of experiments in which different groups of 
subjects were presented with various two person games all of which generate 
the same equilibrium outcomes. The games were related in two ways. First, 
each had a similar sequential structure and each had the same set of Nash 
equilibrium payoffs. They differed in the set of subgame perfect outcomes or 
in the set of outcomes which survived the deletion of dominated strategies (by 
pure strategies). Second, each game was presented in two different forms. To 
some groups of subjects the game was presented and described in the normal 
form as a matrix of strategies and payoffs. To other groups of subjects the 
game was presented and described in an extensive form with an explicit 
sequential structure. In no case did a subject have more than three 
strategies from which to choose. In each case, one of the players could 
guarantee a secure outcome and the other player possessed a self-defeating 
(incredible) threat. 
Our results strongly confirm the presence of significant framing or 
presentation effects. In a simple two stage game with just two strategies for 
each player, we observed a dramatic difference in the behavior of the subjects 
depending on whether the game was presented as matrix in which the players 
move simultaneously or as a tree in which the players move sequentially. 
However, we were unable to substantiate the impact that the presentation of a 
problem has on the saliency of our two principles of rationality. In those 
experiments where we expected that our rationality principles would predict 
differences in behavior across game forms, either no such differences appeared 
or the differences were not what we expected. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the decision 
problems which form the basis of our experiment. Section 3 describes our 
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experimental design and reviews our experimental procedures. In Section 4 we 
formulate three hypotheses around which we organize the discussion of the 
results of experiments in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss some issues 
arising from the analysis of our results and present the results of some 
additional experiments. In Section 7, we discuss some related experimental 
work by other researchers. Section 8 summarizes our conclusions. 
2. Presentation Effects and Rationality 
We designed a set of six complementary two-person decision problems. 
These decision problems are described below. 
2.1 The Baseline Problem: Backward Induction and Iterated Dominance 
Problems 1M and lS below constitute our baseline problems. They are 
strategically equivalent in the sense that their set of strategies and payoffs 
are isomorphic. Subject A has two strategies. If he chooses 11 L", both 
subjects receive a payoff of 4. If he chooses "R", the payoff depends on the 
strategy chosen by subject B. If subject B chooses "L", subject A earns 0 and 
subject B earns 1. If he chooses "R", subject A earns 6 and subject B 
earns 3. 
Problem 1M Problem lS 
Subject B Subject A 4,4 
L 
L R R 
L 4,4 4,4 Subject B 0,1 
Subject A L 
R 0,1 6,3 R 
6,3 
-4-
There are two Nash equilibrium outcomes, (4,4) and (6,3). However, 
(6,3) is the only outcome which survives the deletion of dominated strategies, 
and, in problem lS, it is the only subgame perfect outcome. Thus, both of the 
principles of rationality mentioned above lead to the same outcome. 
The next two pairs of games are variations on the baseline problem. 
They are designed to isolate the role of iterated dominance and backward 
induction as the effective principles which guide the behavior of the 
subjects. 
2.2 Backward Induction Without Iterated Dominance 
Problems 2M and 2S below are strategically equivalent games with the 
same set of equilibrium payoffs as the baseline problem. They differ from the 
baseline problem only in that the (6,3) outcome has been replaced with a 
subgame with the same (mixed strategy) equilibrium payoff. In problem (2S), 
the natural extensive form of the game, subgame perfection again requires both 
players to choose "R" to obtain an expected outcome of (6,3). 
However, both the (4,4) and (6,3) outcomes survive the deletion of 
dominated strategies (with respect to pure strategies2 ). 
2 The (4,4) outcome does not satisfy the deletion of strategies dominated by 
mixtures of strategies. For instance a convex combination of M and B 
dominates T for player b. To construct a game in which (4,4) survives 
iterated dominance by mixed strategies requires at least four strategies for 
each player with a complicated set of payoffs. We did not study such a game 
because we did not want to introduce such complexity into the subgame. 
Nevertheless, the current design is certainly flawed as a test of subgame 
perfection in the absence of iterated dominance. 
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Problem 2M Problem 2S 
Subject B 4,4 Subject A 
L 
T M B R 
T 4,4 4,4 4,4 0,1 Subject B 
Subject L 
M 0,1 7,0 5,6 R 
A 
B 0,1 5,6 7,0 
Subject B 
T B 
T 7,0 5,6 
Subject A 
B 5,6 7,0 
2.3 Iterated Dominance Without Backward Induction 
Problems 3M and 3S represent another pair of strategically equivalent 
variations on the baseline problem. Again the (6,3) payoff has been replaced 
with a simple bimatrix game. In this case, however, the subgame has two 
equilibria (6,3) and (3,6). Consequently, both (4,4) and (6,3) are subgame 
perfect. However, since "T" dominates 11 B" for player A in problem 3M 
(equivalently, "L" dominates "TB" in problem 3S), it follows that only the 
(6,3) outcome survives iterated deletion of (weakly) dominated strategies. 
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Problem 3M Problem 3S 
Subject B 4,4 Subject A 
L 
T M B R 
T 4,4 4,4 4,4 0,1 Subject B 
Subject L 
M 0,1 6,3 0,0 R 
A 
B 0,1 0,0 3,6 
Subject B 
T B 
T 6,3 0,0 
Subject A 
B 0,0 3,6 
2.4 A Summary of the Outcomes 
Table 3.1 summarizes the outcomes of the different games in relation 
to the hypotheses which we formulate in Section 5 below. In each case, both 
the matrix and sequential versions of the game have the same pair of Nash 
equilibrium outcomes. In the matrix version of the games, subgarne perfection 
adds no restrictions. However, in the sequential versions, it restricts the 
outcome to (6,3) in games lS and 2S, but leaves both the (4,4) and (6,3) 
outcome in game 3S. In Section 5, we suggest that iterated dominance may be 
more transparent in the matrix version of the games. Restricting attention to 
the matrix versions of the games, the deletion of strategies weakly dominated 
by pure strategies results in the (6,3) outcome in games 1M and 2M, but leaves 
both the (4,4) and (6,3) outcomes in game 2M. 
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TABLE 3-1 Summary of Decision Problems 
Outcomes ~E - I Exper. Structure Iter. Dom. Sub game Perf. 
1M Matrix (6,3),(4,4) (6,3) - - - - -
lS Sequential (6,3) '(4,4) ----- (6,3) 
2M Matrix (6,3),(4,4) (6,3),(4,4) -----
2S Sequential (6,3) '(4,4) ----- (6,3) 
3M Matrix (6,3),(4,4) (6,3) -----
3S Sequential (6,3)' (4,4) ----- (6,3),(4,4) 
3. Experimental Design 
The instructions for problems 1M and lS are included in Appendix A. 
(The instructions for the other problems is available on request.) Subjects 
were New York University undergraduate students, drawn primarily from first 
year economics courses. Each subject participated in only one decision 
problem. 
Typically, there were a total of ten subjects in any given 
experimental session. Each subject sat at a PC terminal and was given a copy 
of the instructions. Half of the subjects were randomly assigned to be type A 
and half assigned to be type B. Each subject was informed of only his own 
type. The experiment administrator read the instructions aloud and publicly 
answered any questions. Subjects then played six practice rounds with a 
partner chosen at random in each round. To avoid biasing the choices in the 
actual experiment to follow, letters rather than numbers were used to stand 
for payoffs during the practice rounds. Upon completion of the practice 
rounds, the subjects were randomly assigned a different partner in each of the 
successive rounds. Consequently, the number of rounds played by any group of 
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subjects depended on the number of subjects in the group. The subjects were 
explicitly told that no two subjects were ever paired against each other more 
than once. 
After both a subject and his partner made their choices, the choice of 
the subject and his payoff were listed on the screen along with his choices 
and payoffs in any previous rounds. (In the practice rounds the payoff letter 
was used.) Subjects were not explicitly informed of the action taken by their 
partners. This guaranteed that a subject obtained the same information about 
the behavior of his partner in all versions of the problem. The subjects were 
told that each payoff point they earned could be cashed in for $.70. Typical 
earnings ranged from $12 to $18. 
In designing the experiment, we had two major concerns. Our biggest 
concern was that the subjects perceive the problem as a one shot game and not 
try to establish a norm for future play through their own actions. In a pilot 
experiment we let the subjects play against opponents selected at random for 
30 rounds with much lower payoffs in each round. In a post experiment 
questionnaire, a significant proportion of the subjects indicated that they 
were trying to build a reputation across rounds, even though there was only a 
small probability that they would face another subject more than once. After 
the design change, responses to a similar questionnaire indicated that these 
kind of considerations were not a significant factor. 
4. Hypotheses 
Our experimental design allows us to conduct a number of tests 
relating the presentation of a game to the way it is played. First of all 
there is a simple test of the 11 invariance 11 principle which requires that the 
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solution of a game be invariant with respect to its representation. Second, 
if the solution proves not be invariant, then we may investigate the relation 
between the saliency of specific "principles of rationality" and the form in 
which a game is represented or described to the players. 
4.1 Invariance 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) argue that the set of outcomes of a game 
which constitute a self-enforcing agreement should depend only on its 
strategic form. Consequently, if the solution is unique, it should predict 
the same behavior regardless of how the game is represented. A weaker 
hypothesis, but one which does not presume the validity of any particular 
solution concept is simply to predict that the actual play of the game is 
independent of its representation. This leads to the following null 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis I (invariance): In each pair of games, the outcomes should occur 
in the same proportion in the two representations. 
In fact, if we assume that the agents act independently, the actions 
of each subject type should occur in the same proportion. The independence 
assumption is required because when subject A chooses "L" in the sequential 
version of a game, subject B is not given an opportunity to respond. 
Consequently, in the sequential version of a game, we observe only the action 
of subject B when player A chooses "R11 , while we always observe his action in 
the matrix version. 
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4_2 The Saliency of Subgame Perfection and Iterated Dominance 
In opposition to the invariance principle, there is considerable 
evidence by researchers such as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that the 
presentation or "frame 11 of a problem may substantially influence the decisions 
of subjects. Similarly, in the context of a multiperson decision problem, its 
presentation may influence the confidence with which the participants believe 
it is common knowledge that all participants respect a given rationality 
principle. We wished to test two conjectures. First, we conjectured that 
backward induction is more salient when the sequential nature of the game is 
emphasized. Second, we conjectured that solutions consistent with the 
iterated deletion of dominated strategies are more likely when the game is 
represented in strategic form so that the dominance relations are more 
apparent. Our remaining hypotheses were designed to operationalize these 
conjectures. 
Since Problem 2 contains no strategies which are dominated by pure 
strategies, but does contain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the 
sequential version of the game, our first conjecture suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis II (backward induction): The proportion of times in which subjects 
play in a way which is consistent with an expected return of (6,3) when 
playing game 2S is no less than when playing game 2M. 
Similarly, in Problem 3, both the (4,4) outcome and the (6,3) outcome 
are subgame perfect in both versions of the game, while only the (6,3) outcome 
survives the iterated deletion of dominated strategies. Since we conjectured 
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that the subjects are more likely to believe that both players are aware of 
the dominance relations when the game is represented as a matrix, we were led 
to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis III (iterated dominance): The proportion of times in which 
subjects achieve the (6,3) outcome when playing game 3M is no less than when 
playing game 3S. 
5. The Results 
In this section, we summarize the results of our basic experiments and 
discuss the implications for the three hypotheses stated above. The results 
are tabulated in Tables 1 to 4. For all of the basic experiments, we report 
the number of responses of each choice in each round aggregated across 
cohorts. We also present the total number of responses of each choice by 
cohort. To check for differences across individuals, we also report the 
number of subjects who made each choice a given number of times in the matrix 
version of the games. (This information for the sequential games is less 
informative since the number of choices a given subject makes is variable.) 
A complete history of each subject is available from the authors upon request. 
Given the preliminary nature of the investigation, we have not performed any 
formal statistical tests. 
5.1 Hypothesis I 
Table 1 summarizes the results for the baseline experiment, Problem 1. 
A total of 20 subjects of each type played at least three rounds of the matrix 
version 1M and 16 subjects played at least five rounds of the sequential 
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version lS. For game 1M, 57% of the type A responses were to play the secure 
strategy "L" and 20% of the type B responses were to play the dominated 
strategy "L". For game lS, both types of subjects almost always chose "R". 
(Of the seven "L" responses by type A subjects, six were by the same subject 
who later indicated that he had misunderstood the payoffs.) 
The results suggest a clear rejection of the invariance hypothesis I. 
The presentation of the game appears to have significantly affected the way 
both types of players play the game. 
5.2 Hypothesis II 
Table 2 summarizes the results for Problem 2. Ten subjects of each 
type played 5 rounds of both the matrix and sequential versions. In the 
matrix version 2M, 28% of the type A responses were to play the secure choice 
"T", while 12% of the type B responses were to employ the threat "T". For 
game 2S, 24% of the type A responses were to play the secure choice "L", while 
10% of the type B responses were to employ the threat strategy "L". 
Since there appears to be no significant difference in the way 
subjects play the two versions, we cannot reject hypothesis II. On the other 
hand, our results do not give any positive evidence that the subgame 
perfection in the absence of clear iterated dominance is particularly salient 
as solution principle. 
The results of Problem 2 were surprising in two respects. First, the 
strong presentation effect which we observed in Problem I completely 
disappeared, even though the problems are quite similar. Second, the behavior 
of subjects in the matrix version of the game is not what we would have 
expected given their behavior in the corresponding version of Problem 1. Type 
-13-
A subjects were more likely to play the secure strategy and type B subjects as 
least as likely to play the threat strategy in game 1M as in game 2M even 
though the dominance of the threat strategy is much clearer in Problem I. 
5.3 Hypothesis III 
Table 3 summarizes the results for Problem 3. Ten subjects of each 
type played 5 rounds of the matrix version of the game and ten subjects of 
each type played 5 rounds of the sequential version. The unique iterated 
dominance equilibrium outcome (6,3) was attained only two times in the matrix 
version 3M and 4 times in the sequential version 3S. The low number of hits 
reflects the fact that the secure choice "T" was chosen by type A subjects 82% 
of the time in matrix version 3M and 70% of the time in the sequential 
version 3S. 
Beyond the fact that the iterated dominance solution was rarely chosen 
in either version, the behavior of the subjects indicates additional support 
for the hypothesis that iterated dominance is no less likely to be salient 
when the game is presented as a simultaneous move game. In neither case, did 
the type A subjects play the dominated strategy ("B" in game 3M and "RB" in 
game 3S) more than twice. However, once these dominated strategies are 
eliminated, player B strategies "B" (in 3M) and "RB" (in 3S) are weakly 
dominated by "M" and "RT" respectively. Yet type B players played "M" 13 
times and "B" only 2 times in the matrix version, while in the sequential 
version, they played the analogs "RT" 4 times and "RB 11 9 times. It appears, 
therefore, that type B players are less likely to play the strategies which 
are weakly dominated after the deletion of the dominated type A strategies in 
the matrix version of the game. (In a later test, reported in Section 6.4 
below, however, we observed quite different behavior.) 
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6- Nev Questions and Further Tests 
Although our results suggest some clear patterns they have raised more 
questions than they have answered. In this section we explore some of these 
new questions and indicate some preliminary attempts to address some of them. 
6-1 Framing in Description versus Framing in Structure 
In both problems 1 and 3, the threat strategy is used much less 
frequently in the matrix versions of the game than in the sequential version, 
(In problem 2, there is no appreciable difference.) In both cases, the threat 
strategy is dominated (by a mixed strategy in game 3). Various factors might 
account for these differences. However, it may be worth noting that in the 
matrix version, the dominance is weak, while in the sequential version, the 
dominance is strong at the start of the subgame at which subject B makes his 
choice. One might argue, therefore, that we are testing for more than just a 
presentation effect. We are also testing whether their responses are affected 
by a change in the description of the game combined with a corresponding 
change in the information available to the subjects at the time the make their 
decisions. 
To separate these two effects, we constructed a hybrid version of 
Problem I in which the game was described sequentially and represented as a 
tree as in experiment lS, but in which player B was required to make his 
choice simultaneously with player A as in experiment 1M. That is, subject B 
was required to commit himself to a course of action in the event that subject 
A chose "R" before being told whether or not he would actually be given a 
choice. 
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The results are reported in Table 4. Fifteen subjects of both types 
participated in the experiment in at least four rounds each. Fourteen percent 
of the type A responses were to play the secure strategy "L". Twelve percent 
of the type B responses were to play the dominated threat strategy "L". The 
number of observations is probably too limited to be conclusive. However, the 
results suggest that both the change in description of the game and its 
structure influence the play of the subjects. Both types of subjects are more 
likely to play in a way consistent with (6,3) outcome in the hybrid version 
than in the matrix version, but they are less likely to reach the (6,3) 
outcome in the hybrid version than in the sequential version. 
6.2 Modifications of Problem 3 
In Problem 3S, type B subjects were given an opportunity to respond 
only 30% of the time. Evidently the risk of not coordinating in the second 
period was sufficiently great to deter a choice of "R". To induce type A 
subjects to choose "R" more often, we also ran a few sessions in which the 
payoffs in the second stage of the game were modified. In one case, we 
replaced off diagonal payoffs of (0,0) with (2,2). In another case, we 
replaced the (6,3) and (3,6) payoffs with ((8,4) and (4,8). Both matrix and 
sequential versions of these games were tested. The results are reported in 
Tables 6 and 7. 
The results do not suggest any major revisions in our conclusions. As 
might be expected, type A subjects played the secure strategy less often. 
Also, type B subjects played strategy "B" more often. Player B also played 
the threat strategy less often, although not as infrequently as might be 
expected. In the matrix version with (2,2) payoffs on the off diagonals, his 
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threat strategy "T" is strongly dominated. Yet type B subjects played "T" 11% 
of the time. This behavior may be limited to a small fraction of the 
population, however. Only 3 of the 12 subjects ever chose this response and 
one of the subjects chose it 4 times. 
6.3 Communication and Learning 
In each of the games, the solution implied by one or both of the 
rationality principles defined above is unique. However, this outcome is 
consistently attained in only problem lS. In all of the other cases, the 
observed behavior is not consistent with any Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, 
most of the subjects experimented with different choices in the three to six 
rounds they played the game. This suggests that the subjects were not very 
confident about how their opponents would play the game. 
A common interpretation of Nash equilibrium and its various 
refinements is that it is a self enforcing convention (or at least that any 
self enforcing convention is contained in the set of Nash equilibria). 
Therefore, the test of the refinement (or its underlying principles) should 
not be based only on how agents play the game in the first few rounds or even 
after several rounds. Rather, it should satisfy the following two criteria. 
First, no convention which is not consistent with that refinement can be 
sustained. Second, we should be able to demonstrate that there is a method of 
leading the subjects to consistently play according to a convention which does 
satisfy that refinement. This suggests that we need to redesign the 
experiment to give subjects more opportunities to establish a convention. 
We mention here three possible methods of testing to see which if any 
conventions of play can be adopted and sustained. One is to allow the players 
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to play more rounds of the game, alternating roles, with more time to 
contemplate their actions between rounds. For instance, they might be asked 
to explicitly predict the action of their opponent before making their choice 
as in Van Huyck, Battaliio, and Beil (1990). Another possibility is to allow 
for preplay communication which gives agents an opportunity to explain their 
reasoning and to explicitly agree on a convention. (See Cooper, DeJong, 
Forsythe, and Ross for a nice study of the effect of preplay communication in 
the battle of the sexes game.) Finally, we might publicly suggest various 
convention of play, perhaps with some accompanying explanation, and determine 
which conventions are sustained. This approach has been used by Van Huyck, 
Gillette, and Battalio (1989) to test various deductive equilibrium selection 
principles. 
To date we have experimented only with the possibility of reversing 
roles and only in problem 3M. In one session, we informed the subjects that 
they were to participate in two experiments. At the end of the first 
experiment they were given the same game but assigned the opposite role. 
The results are reported in Table 8. For the first six rounds of the 
experiment, most type A responses were the secure strategy "T 11 , while most 
type B choices were strategy "B". In the second six rounds, with the roles of 
the subjects reversed, the behavior of the new type A subjects was largely the 
same as before. If anything, there was an even greater tendency to play the 
secure strategy. However, there does appear to have been a significant change 
in the behavior of the type B subjects (formerly type A subjects). During 
these rounds, type B subjects chose strategy "M" slightly more often than "B". 
There was less variation in the responses of individual subjects after 
the roles were reversed, suggesting that the individual subjects were more 
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convinced of their best responses. However, it is not clear what convention, 
if any, the subjects would eventually settle upon if the process were 
continued. We suspect the change in behavior the behavior of the type B 
subjects is indicative of a tendency which would persist if even more rounds 
were played. We also suspect that the change in behavior after the roles were 
reversed was due in part to the fact that the subjects had a chance to think 
about the game while the procedures were explained again and the monitor 
checked to make sure everyone understood their roles in the remaining rounds. 
7. Related Work 
Although we are not aware of any work which focuses on explicitly on 
the presentation effects which we study here, several authors have begun to 
investigate the saliency of various solution concepts in games involving a 
small number of players. Future work on studying presentation effects should 
benefit both from the insights these studies yield as well as their 
methodology. 
We may divide this work into two groups. The first body of work is 
concerned with testing various principles of equilibrium selection. Roughly 
speaking, a selection principle is designed to complement a theory of multi-
person rationality when that theory does not lead to a unique prediction of 
behavior. Examples of selection principles are symmetry, payoff dominance, 
and payoff security. Several authors have recently begun to investigate the 
saliency of these various criteria and their dependence on the structure of 
the game. Particularly noteworthy is the work of Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, 
and Ross (1990) and the work of Van Hyuck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) and Van 
Huyck, Gillette, and Battalio (1989). Typically, they consider coordination 
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games in which there are several equilibria satisfying even the strongest 
refinements but in which various selection principles give different but 
unique solutions. Their work provides convincing evidence that no single 
selection principle is always salient. Although we are concerned with testing 
how the presentation of a game affects the saliency of different principles of 
refinement, the general approach is quite similar. In both cases, the basic 
question is not if a principle is salient, but when the principle is salient. 
The other line of experimental work is on equilibrium refinements. 
Much of it has focused on the explanatory power of backward induction in 
multistage games. There are several questions yet to be settled in this 
literature, particularly with respect to the role of learning. Nevertheless, 
it does appear that there are severe limitations to the saliency of backward 
induction in games with many stages or in games in which issues of fairness 
arise. Our results suggest that merely the presentation (or the 
interpretation) of the problem may also have a significant effect. 
Several investigators have also begun to study the explanatory power 
of various forward induction refinements in the context of games of incomplete 
information. Camerer and Weigelt (1988) test a multistage reputation game and 
find that the behavior of the subjects is better explained by the "intuitive" 
criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987) than any other sequential equilibrium. 
Similarly, Brandts and Holt (1987) test a version of the Cho-Kreps 
"beer-quiche" game with two sequential equilibria. They also find that the 
behavior of subjects is better explained by the unique equilibrium satisfying 
the intuitive criterion. Banks, Camerer, and Porter (1988) investigate a 
broad class of games to try to determine the appropriate forward induction 
criteria. They conclude that generally the concept of "divinity" (Banks and 
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Sobel (1987)) accords best with the data. Problem 3 above is most closely 
related to this work. 
Finally, we should mention the work of Beard and Bell (1990) which 
investigates the confidence with which players have in the rationality of 
others. They consider a set of games similar to lS, except that the secure 
payoff to player A is generally much closer to the subgame perfect payoff and 
the threat strategy of player B is not necessarily lower from his payoff when 
player A plays the secure strategy. In contrast to our results, they find 
that a significant fraction (sometimes over 50%) of the type A players choose 
the secure strategy. Our results suggest that if the subjects were to play 
the matrix version of the game, almost none of the subjects would play the 
secure strategy. 
8. Summary and Conclusion 
The behavior of the subjects in problem I strongly rejects the 
hypothesis that the behavior of subjects is invariant to the form of 
presentation of the game. Problem I is a simple two stage game with a secure 
strategy for one player and an incredible threat for the other. Yet the 
outcome of the game is typically quite different when the game is described 
and played as a static problem rather than as a sequential problem. 
Problem II, which was designed to isolate the explanatory power of 
subgame perfection, is probably flawed. First, the subgame perfect outcome 
requires mixed strategies which introduces an additional degree of 
complication and requires stronger assumptions about the preferences of the 
subjects. Second, once we consider mixed strategies, the (4,4) outcome is 
again eliminated by the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. 
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Although subgame perfection is distinct from iterated dominance, the two 
concepts are very closely related when the information structure is relatively 
simple. It is probably more useful to establish less subtle properties before 
trying to firmly establish whether which of the two principles is more 
salient. 
In neither the matrix nor the sequential version did we generally 
obtain the forward induction solution of Problem 3. Evidently it requires 
more experience in the game for players to confidently predict the rational 
responses of their opponents than permitted by our experimental design. 
Finally, we did accumulate some evidence that subjects are much less 
likely to play a strongly dominated strategy than a weakly dominated strategy. 
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Table 1: Aggregated Results for Problem 1 
Matrix Version lH Sequential Version lS 
B 
L R R R 
A--- B ---- 6,3 
L I L I L 4,4 4,4 A 
R 0,1 6,3 4,4 0,1 
Number of Subjects Making Each Choice 
Game: 
Subject: 
Choice: 
Total 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Cohort 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
L 
46 
12 
11 
11 
9 
3 
0 
16 
3 
9 
12 
6 
1M 
A 
R L 
34 16 
8 6 
9 4 
9 2 
5 3 
3 1 
0 0 
14 7 
6 0 
7 5 
4 2 
3 2 
lS 
B A B 
R L R L R 
64 7 79 2 77 
14 2 14 0 14 
16 1 15 1 14 
18 1 15 0 15 
11 1 15 1 14 
5 1 15 0 15 
0 1 5 0 5 
23 1 24 0 24 
9 0 25 1 24 
11 6 30 1 29 
14 
7 
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Table 2: Aggregated Results for Problem 2 
Matrix Version 2M Sequential Version 2S 
T 
A M 
B 
Game: 
Subject: 
Choices: 
Total 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Cohort 
1 
2 
T 
4,4 
0,1 
0,1 
B 
M 
4,4 
7,0 
5,6 
4,4 
B 
4,4 0,1 
5,6 
7,0 
T 
B 
Number of Subjects Making Each Choice 
2M 
A B A 
T M B T M B L R RT RB 
14 19 17 6 14 30 12 38 24 10 
4 3 3 3 1 6 5 5 4 0 
5 2 3 0 4 6 2 8 7 1 
2 6 2 1 2 7 2 8 4 3 
0 4 6 2 3 5 1 9 5 3 
3 4 3 0 4 6 2 8 4 3 
9 9 7 3 6 16 9 16 11 1 
5 10 10 3 8 14 3 22 13 9 
L 
A 
L I R 
B 
I 
R 
T B 
7,0 5,6 
5,6 7,0 
2S 
B 
L RT RB 
4 10 24 
1 2 2 
0 4 4 
1 2 5 
1 1 7 
1 1 6 
4 3 9 
0 7 15 
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Table 3: Aggregated Results for Problem 3 
Matrix Version 3M Sequential Version 3S 
T 
A M 
B 
Game: 
Subject: 
Choices: 
Total 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Cohort 
1 
2 
T 
4,4 
0,1 
0,1 
B 
M 
4,4 
6,3 
0,0 
4,4 
B 
4,4 0,1 
0,0 
3,6 
T 
B 
Number of Subjects Making Each Choice 
3M 
A B A 
T M B T M B L R RT RB 
41 8 1 35 13 2 35 15 13 0 
9 1 0 8 2 0 4 6 4 0 
10 0 0 7 3 0 7 3 3 0 
6 3 1 6 3 1 8 2 2 0 
11 2 0 8 2 0 7 3 3 0 
8 2 0 8 2 0 9 1 1 0 
20 4 1 15 8 2 19 6 4 0 
21 4 0 20 5 0 16 9 9 0 
L 
A 
L I R 
B 
I R 
T B 
6,3 0,0 
0,0 3,6 
3S 
B 
L RT RB 
2 4 9 
2 2 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 1 
0 0 3 
0 0 1 
2 1 3 
0 3 6 
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Table 4: A Comparison of Individual SUbject Behavior 
Number of Subjects Who Chose Each Strategy With a Given Frequency (Number of 
Rounds). 
Problem 1M (Over the first 3 rounds) 
Subject: A B 
Choice: L R L R 
Frequency 
0 6 8 12 1 
1 2 4 5 2 
2 4 2 2 5 
3 8 6 1 12 
Problem 2M (Over the first 5 rounds) 
Subject: 
Choice: 
Frequency 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
T 
2 
3 
4 
1 
0 
0 
A 
M B T 
0 0 4 
4 3 6 
3 7 0 
3 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Problem 3M (Over the first 5 rounds) 
Subject: 
Choice: 
Frequency 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
T 
0 
0 
0 
3 
4 
5 
A 
M B T 
4 9 2 
4 1 0 
2 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 2 
4 0 5 
B 
M 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
0 
B 
M 
6 
1 
1 
0 
0 
2 
B 
0 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
B 
8 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Table 5: Results for Problem lH 
Represented as: 
R R 
A B 6,3 
L 
I L I 
4,4 0,1 
Number of 
Subject: 
Choice: 
Total 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Cohort 
1 
2 
3 
Subjects 
A 
L 
11 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
0 
2 
8 
1 
Making Each Choice 
B 
R L R 
66 10 67 
12 2 13 
14 3 12 
12 2 13 
13 2 13 
9 l 10 
6 0 6 
34 l 35 
17 2 23 
15 9 7 
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Played as: 
B 
L R 
L 4,4 4,4 
A 
R 0,1 6,3 
' 
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Table 6: Results for Modified Problem 3a 
T 
A M 
B 
Matrix Version 3Ma 
T 
4,4 
0,1 
0,1 
B 
M 
4,4 
8,4 
0,0 
B 
4,4 
0,0 
4,8 
Sequential Version 3Sa 
L 
4,4--- A 
L IR 
0,1--- B 
IR 
T B 
T 8,4 0,0 
B 0,0 4,8 
Number of Choices In Each Round 
Game: 
Subject: 
Choices: 
Total 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Cohort 
1 
2 
A 
T M B 
18 3 4 
4 0 1 
3 2 0 
3 1 1 
4 0 1 
4 0 1 
18 3 4 
3Ma 
B 
T M B 
1 5 19 
1 1 3 
0 0 5 
0 1 4 
0 1 4 
0 2 3 
1 5 19 
3Sa 
A B 
L R RT RB L RT RB 
20 30 24 1 5 12 13 
4 6 5 0 1 3 2 
4 6 4 1 1 2 3 
3 7 5 0 2 1 4 
5 5 5 0 0 3 2 
4 6 5 0 1 3 2 
7 18 17 0 1 9 8 
13 12 7 1 4 3 5 
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Table 7: Results for Modified Problem 3b 
T 
A M 
B 
Matrix Version 3Mb 
T 
4,4 
0,1 
0,1 
B 
M 
4,4 
6,3 
2,2 
B 
4,4 
2,2 
3,6 
Sequential Version 3Sb 
L 
4,4 A 
L I R 
0,1 B 
I R 
T B 
T 6,3 2,2 
B 2,2 3,6 
Number of Choices In Each Round 
Game: 
Subject: 
Choices: 
Total 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Cohort 
1 
2 
A 
T M B 
44 24 4 
11 1 0 
7 4 1 
7 5 0 
7 4 1 
9 2 1 
6 6 1 
24 8 4 
20 16 0 
3Mb 
B 
T M B 
8 23 41 
1 4 7 
1 3 8 
2 4 6 
1 4 7 
2 4 6 
1 4 7 
2 8 26 
6 15 15 
3Sb 
A B 
L R RT RB L RT RB 
27 45 37 2 6 12 27 
3 9 8 0 1 2 6 
1 11 10 0 1 4 6 
7 5 5 0 0 2 3 
4 8 7 1 0 3 5 
7 5 4 0 1 0 4 
5 7 3 1 3 1 3 
11 25 20 0 5 8 12 
16 20 17 2 1 4 15 
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Table 8: Results for Repeated Version of Problem 3H 
T 
T 4,4 
A M 0,1 
B 0,1 
B 
M 
4,4 
6,3 
0,0 
B 
4,4 
0,0 
3,6 
In sessions II, the roles of the subjects were reversed. 
Session: 
Subject: 
Choices: 
Total 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4* 
5 
6 
A 
T M 
26 8 
4 2 
4 2 
5 0 
5 1 
3 3 
6 0 
Number of Subjects Making Each Choice 
I 
B A 
B T M B T M B 
1 8 2 25 30 5 1 
0 1 1 4 5 1 0 
0 2 0 4 5 0 1 
1 2 0 4 4 2 0 
0 1 0 4 6 0 0 
0 1 1 4 5 1 0 
0 1 0 5 5 1 0 
II 
B 
T M B 
8 16 32 
2 2 2 
2 3 1 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
*rn session I, one the pairs of responses in round 4 was not recorded. 
Number of Subjects Who Chose Each Strategy With a Given Frequency. 
Session: 
Subject: 
Choice: 
Frequency 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A 
T M B 
0 1 5 
0 2 1 
0 3 0 
1 0 0 
3 0 0 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
I 
B 
T M B 
3 5 1 
2 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
1 0 3 
II 
A B 
T M B T M B 
0 4 5 3 2 3 
0 0 1 1 2 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 2 0 0 
4 0 0 0 2 1 
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Appendix 
This appendix contains the instructions for experiments 1M and lS. 
A.l Experiment lK 
Subject Type __ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in decision making. Several research foundations have 
provided funds for these experiments. If you follow the instructions, and 
make good decisions, you may earn a sizable amount of money. 
The experiment consists of two parts. The first part will be "practice 11 , in 
the sense that payoffs will be non~monetary letter payoffs. The second part 
of the experiment is where your dollar earnings will be determined. Here your 
decisions will earn you monetary payoffs which will be paid to you in cash. 
PRACTICE ROUNDS 
Half of the subjects in the room have been designated as type A subjects and 
half as type B subjects. Your type is printed in the upper right hand corner 
of this instruction sheet. Before each round you will be paired with a 
subject of the opposite type. The experiment will last for 6 rounds. Before 
each round the subject you are paired with will be randomly selected by the 
computer. 
In each decision round, the two of you will simultaneously choose between two 
alternatives. The choices made by the two of you will determine how many 
points you earn in that round. 
The payoffs resulting from the decisions that the two of you make in any round 
are described in the matrix below. That is, this matrix tells you the outcome 
of the four possible decision choice pairs. The two choices for Subject B are 
listed along the top of the matrix. The two choices for Subject A are listed 
along the left side of the matrix. For any pair of choices, the first 
letter in the corresponding box gives you the payoff to Subject A, and the 
second letter gives the payoff to Subject B. 
Choices for Subject B 
L R 
Choices for L M,W Q,K 
Subject A R A,B C,P 
Some Examples: 
Suppose Subject A selects Choice L and Subject B selects Choice R. Then the 
outcome is represented by the letters Q,K. 
Suppose Subject A selects Choice R and Subject B selects Choice L. Then the 
outcome is represented by the letters A,B. 
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
As you sit at your computer the monitor screen should look like this: 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
<<<<<<<<< 
Your 
Choice 
Please Wait 
The 
Outcome 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
As the experiment proceeds you and your various counterparts will fill in the 
columns of this screen by making your choices. In round 1 when we tell you to 
begin, the following prompt will appear at the bottom of your screen: 
Please make your choice: L or R 
You will then type the letter L or R into the keyboard. The computer will 
then respond with the following message at the bottom of the screen: 
Is ___ your choice? (Y/N) 
If this choice is the one you want, type Y. That will enter your choice into 
the computer. If you type N, the computer will ask you to choose again. 
Your counterpart for that round will be asked to do the same thing. After 
both of you have recorded your choices, the computer will compute your 
earnings and the following message will appear at the bottom of the screen: 
You selected Choice The outcome is 
<< Press any key to Continue >> 
The computer will then record this information in the table above (on your 
monitor screen). You will then be asked to wait until all subjects in the 
experiment have completed the round. Notice that you are not explicitly told 
what choice your counterpart selected. 
After completing round 1 you then proceed to round 2. We will proceed this 
way for 6 rounds. 
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YOUR DECISION PROBLEM 
This decision situation is very similar to the one you just completed. Half 
the subjects in the room have been designated as type A subjects and half as 
type B subjects. Your type is printed in the upper right hand corner of the 
instruction sheet. Before each round you will be paired with a subject of the 
opposite type. The experiment will last for 5 rounds. In each of the five 
rounds, you will play against a different subject of the opposite type. That 
is. you will never play against the same subject of the opposite type more 
than once. 
As before, in each decision round the two of you will simultaneously choose 
between two alternatives. The choices by the two of you will determine how 
many points you earn in that round. 
The payoffs resulting from the decisions that the two of you make in any round 
are described in the matrix below. That is, this matrix tells you how many 
points each of the four possible decision choice pairs are worth to you. The 
two choices for Subject B are listed along the top of the matrix. The two 
choices for Subject A are listed along the left side of the matrix. For any 
pair of choices, the first number in the corresponding box gives you the point 
payoff to Subject A, and the second number gives the point payoff to Subject 
B. 
Choices for Subject B 
L R 
Choices for L 4,4 4,4 
Subject A R 0,1 6,3 
Some Examples: 
Suppose Subject A selects Choice L and Subject B selects Choice R. Then 
Subject A earns 4 points and Subject B earns four points. 
Suppose Subject A selects Choice R and Subject B selects Choice L. Then 
Subject A earns 0 points and Subject B earns 1 point. 
PAYOFFS 
Your dollar earnings for the experiment are determined as follows. First, we 
will sum up your point total over the 5 rounds. Then we will multiply this 
sum by $.70. 
The procedure will be the same one you followed in the practice game. 
Remember, in each round you will be paired with a new (and different) 
counterpart. You will never play against the same counterpart more than once. 
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A.2 Erperiment lS 
Subject Type __ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in decision making. Several research foundations have 
provided funds for these experiments. If you follow the instructions, and 
make good decisions, you may earn a sizable amount of money. The experiment 
consists of two parts. The first part will be "practice", in the sense that 
payoffs will be non~monetary letter payoffs. The second part of the 
experiment is where your dollar earnings will be determined. Here your 
decisions will earn you monetary payoffs which will be paid to you in cash. 
PRACTICE ROUNDS 
Half of the subjects in the room have been designated as type A subjects and 
half as type B subjects. Your type is printed in the upper right hand corner 
of this instruction sheet. Before each round you will be paired with a 
subject of the opposite type with this subject being randomly selected by the 
computer. The experiment will last for 6 rounds. 
In each round, the decision problem faced by you and your counterpart is 
summarized in the diagram below. The choices made by the two of you will 
determine how many points you earn in the round. Subject A chooses first. If 
Subject A selects L, then Subject B has no choice and Subject A receives M and 
Subject B receives W. If Subject A chooses R, then Subject B must make a 
choice. If Subject B chooses L, then Subject A receives A and Subject B 
receives B. If Subject B chooses R, then Subject A receives C and Subject B 
receives P. 
Payoff 
Payoff -
Subject A 
Subject B 
Some Examples: 
M 
w 
Subject A 
A 
B 
Subject B 
c 
p 
Suppose Subject A selects Choice L. Then the outcome is represented by the 
letters M,W. 
Suppose Subject A selects Choice R and Subject B selects Choice L. Then the 
outcome is represented by the letters A,B. 
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
As you sit at your computer the monitor 
Your 
screen should look like this: 
Round Choice 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
<<<<<<<<< Please Wait 
The 
Outcome 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
As the experiment proceeds you and your various counterparts will fill in the 
columns of this screen by making your choices. 
If you are Subject A: 
In round 1 when we tell you to begin, the following prompt will appear at the 
bottom of your screen: 
Please make your choice: L or R 
You will then type the letter L or R into the keyboard. The computer will 
then respond with the following message at the bottom of the screen: 
Is ___ your choice? (Y/N) 
If this choice is the one you want, type Y. That will enter your choice into 
the computer. If you type N, the computer will ask you to choose again. 
If you select Choice L, then the following prompt will appear at the bottom of 
the screen: 
You selected Choice L. The round is over. You earned M 
<< Press any key to continue >> 
If you select choice R, the following prompt will appear at the bottom of the 
screen: 
You selected Choice R. 
<< Please wait while Subject B makes his choice >> 
After Subject B makes his choice, the computer computes the payoffs and the 
following message appears at the bottom of the screen: 
You selected Choice The outcome is 
<< Press any key to Continue >> 
The computer will then record this information in the table above (on your 
monitor screen). You will then be asked to wait until all subjects in the 
experiment have completed the round. Notice that you are not explicitly told 
what choice your counterpart selected. 
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If you are Subject B: 
In round 1 when we tell you to begin, the following prompt will appear at the 
bottom of you screen: 
<< Please wait for Subject A to make a choice >> 
If Subject A chooses L, the round is over and the following prompt will appear 
at the bottom of the screen: 
<< You have no choice to 
<< Press any 
make. 
key to 
You earned 4 points 
continue >> 
>> 
The computer will then record this information in the table above. An 
asterisk (*) will indicate you had no choice to make. You will then be asked 
to wait until all subjects have completed the round. 
If Subject A chooses R, the following prompt will appear. 
Please make a choice: Lor R 
You will then type the letter L or R into the keyboard. The computer will 
then respond with the following message at the bottom of the screen: 
Is ___ your choice? (Y/N) 
If this choice 
the computer. 
After you make 
the screen: 
is the one you want, type Y. That will enter your choice into 
If you type N, the computer will ask you to choose again. 
your choice, the following prompt will appear at the bottom of 
You selected Choice You earned points. 
After completing round 1 you then proceed to round 2. We will proceed this 
way for 6 rounds. 
YOUR DECISION PROBLEM 
This decision situation is very similar to the one you just completed. Half 
the subjects in the room have been designated as type A subjects and half as 
type B subjects. Your type is printed in the upper right hand corner of the 
instruction sheet. Before each round you will be paired with a subject of the 
opposite type. The experiment will last for 4 to 6 rounds. In each round, 
you will play against a different subject of the opposite type. That is, you 
will never play against the same subject of the opposite type more than once. 
As before, in each decision round the two of you will choose between two 
alternatives. The choices by the two of you will determine how many points 
you earn in that round. 
The payoffs resulting from the decisions that the two of you make in any round 
are described in the diagram below. That is, this diagram tells you how many 
points each of the four possible decision choice pairs are worth to you. 
Payoff 
Payoff 
Subject A 
Subject B 
Some Examples: 
4 
4 
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Subject A 
0 
1 
Subject B 
6 
3 
Suppose Subject A selects Choice L. Then Subject A earns 4 points and Subject 
B earns four points. 
Suppose Subject A selects Choice R and Subject B selects Choice L. Then 
Subject A earns 0 points and Subject B earns 1 point. 
PAYOFFS 
Your dollar earnings for the experiment are determined as follows. First, we 
will sum up your point total over the 5 rounds. Then we will multiply this 
sum by $.70. 
The procedure will be the same one you followed in the practice game. 
Remember, in each round you will be paired with a new (and different) 
counterpart. You will never play against the same counterpart more than once. 
